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**WILL THERE BE
WAR?**

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See page 11 to 18.

ANALYSIS OF THE ELEMENTS

WHICH CONSTITUTE, RESPECTIVELY, THE
POWER OF ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES

RESULT, AND CONSEQUENCES

OF AN
OBSTINATE WAR BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

CURSORY REMARKS ON THE TONE AND TACTICS

OF THE
BRITISH ORGANS IN AMERICA.

STRICTURES ON THE ASHBURTON TREATY.

The Development of a Possible Emergency,

THAT WOULD, INEVITABLY, BE

THE CAUSE OF WAR.

Comments on the President's Message.

THE PROPER COURSE TO SECURE, PEACEABLY,

THE WHOLE OF THE OREGON.

ETC., ETC., ETC.

BY AN ADOPTED CITIZEN.

NEW YORK:

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INTRODUCTION.

IN the fall of the year 1843, I went over to Europe with my family, for the purpose of travelling, particularly in France, which is my native country. While in Paris, where I resided nearly twelve months, I was grieved to see that the tone of the French press had become altogether unfriendly to this country, and I noticed that the daily abuse lavished by the English press on the people, and on the institutions of the United States, was promptly echoed by the Parisian papers. The organ of the French Government, the *Journal des D bats*, was particularly remarkable for its systematic, insidious, malignant, and persevering efforts to traduce and villify the American character; and in December, 1844, the virulence of the ministerial paper became so outrageous, that I made up my mind to expose publicly, in a daily paper, the utter falsity of its calumnious aspersions. I found, that it was not an easy matter to get my articles inserted, *in extenso*, in the daily journals, some of them, such as the *Siecle*, the *Commerce*, and the *Constitutionnel*, gave only the spirit of my manuscripts; the *National* inserted one or two articles: but it was only in *La Reforme* that my views on American affairs appeared without mutilation; they formed a connected series of articles published over the signature of "*Un Citoyen des Etats Unis*;" and, in course of time, they were republished in two pamphlets; and although my arguments did not prevent the French Government from interfering in the affair of Texas, it exposed, publicly, intrigues which had been kept in the dark, and a change in the tone of the Parisian press, except in the organs of the French Government, became, at that time, easily perceptible: that *change* was entirely in favour of the United States.

On my return to my adopted country, I found that considerable excitement existed as to the uncertainty of our relations with England; it appeared to me, that the press was generally at fault as to the proper course to follow, in order, on the one hand, to secure peace, and, at the same time, on the other, to sustain and vindicate with becoming spirit our national rights. I felt convinced that such a course could be pointed out; and, moreover, that the propriety and efficiency thereof could be supported by uncontrovertible facts and arguments. The task, at the present time, was personally inconvenient; I have, however, undertaken to do it in the following pages:—the hesitation and the conflicting views which appear to prevail in Congress on the subject of our foreign relations, have led me into the belief, that the measures which I propose, under a firm conviction of their efficacy, may not be untimely.

Introduction.

The first article of this pamphlet, headed "War and Oregon," was published in the *Daily Globe* on the 15th of November;* it is a brief exposition of the whole subject. Eight other articles appeared successively in the same paper, and in reading them the reader ought to bear in mind *the date* of the publication, as it shows strikingly the general inconsistency of the press, at the same time that it tests the correctness of the views expressed in said articles. To illustrate my meaning, I will merely point out one instance relative to the inconsistency of the press. As early as the beginning of November, the influential papers of this city were nearly unanimous in daily abusing the President on account of his stand on the subject of Oregon. The burst of popular approbation which greeted the Message of Mr. Polk, bore too strongly the stamp of public opinion to be misunderstood, and the editors of those papers shifted their ground at once; many of them even went so far as to express themselves *satisfied* with confiding the care of our foreign relations to the *prudence* of an Executive, whom, only a few days previously, they were villifying at a great rate. By degrees, however, they have broke ground on another course; they do not abuse the administration—they rather flatter it; but they are covertly at work, and try what they can to defeat the measures recommended by the President, by urging delay, &c. Well, the series of articles contained in this pamphlet takes a space of time of about two months, and forms a kind of political record of the events which have occurred within that period: and, as I stated at the outset, it will be well to bear in mind *the date of each article* at the time it is read.

In conclusion, I call the attention of the reader, in a special manner, to that part of the pamphlet which contains the "Analysis of the Elements which constitute the power of Great Britain," &c., from pages 11 to 18. It may not be amiss to remark, while on this subject, that I have lived eight years in England, where, having plenty of leisure, I devoted most of my time to study the mechanism of its government, and to make out and appreciate the *springs* which give motion and power to its complicated machinery; and it may be stated, moreover, that I have been an attentive and *disinterested* observer of public events for the last forty years.

AN ADOPTED CITIZEN.

NEW YORK, Jan. 15th, 1845.

* The dates of the articles contained in this pamphlet have been taken from the original manuscripts, and as they vary, now and then, a few days from the dates they appeared in the *Daily Globe*, I annex herewith, for the convenience of those who might desire to compare them, a correct list of the dates they appeared first in print. The articles in the *Globe* will be found identically the same as those in this pamphlet; no change whatever has been made, except those necessary to correct typographical errors, and to connect the articles together in their new form.

1st article appeared Nov. 15	4th article appeared Dec. 17	7th article appeared Dec. 30
2nd " " " 26	5th " " " 23	8th " " " Jan. 1
3rd " " " 6	6th " " " 24	9th " " " 7

WAR AND OREGON.

NEW YORK, November 13th, 1845.

The organs of the British interests in this city have been loud, for a few days past, in their denunciations against the views of the American Government on the subject of the Oregon Territory. They have received their cue from their patrons by the last steamer from England. Here is the substance of their vituperations, divested from the foul abuse with which they are intermixed: They pretend that the United States have actually acknowledged the title of Great Britain down to latitude 49, and that therefore President Polk was and is wilfully wrong, in asserting that the American title to Oregon is unquestionable. The *Commercial Advertiser*, the *Journal of Commerce*, the *Express*, and the *Tribune*, maintain alike that England is clearly right on the subject of Oregon; and the proof thereof—as they affirm—is, that she is willing to submit the case to the arbitration of any *crowned head* in Europe. They threaten that war is inevitable, if the resolutions which passed the House of Representatives last winter are adopted by both Houses in the next session of Congress; and they point significantly to the immense maritime preparations of Great Britain, which many of the late English papers insinuate, with an air of mystery, squint terribly towards Oregon. The obvious purpose of this *simultaneous movement* on both sides of the Atlantic is, no doubt, to *intimidate Congress*.

The *Morning Courier and Enquirer* of last Saturday, awkwardly enough, lets the cat out of the bag, as follows: "They (Congress) know now—which they did not know last winter—that to vote for such a measure, is to vote for War." The *Courier* appear to entertain a very mean opinion of Congress. The House of Representatives passed last winter, by a large majority, resolutions organising a government in Oregon; but now that they find that *England threatens*, that war, as is pretended, is inevitable, they will no doubt *back out*, says the *Courier*.

The zealous endeavours of the whole or the corrupt organs of the British interests will not succeed to mislead public opinion, even backed, as they appear to be, by the leaders of the Whig party; the great majority of the people of this country feel confident that the General Government will insist only on what is *clearly right*; they know that *Republican America* has no chance for a fair arbitrament from any of the Sovereigns or the Monarchies of Europe, particularly at this present time, when European statesmen, Mr. Guizot in their number, have publicly made known their opposition and dislike to the extension of Democratic principles. The people of the United States are generally convinced that the intrigues of England are dangerous, but her threats are *harmless—regardless* of her threats we have annexed Texas, *without a war*, and we will ultimately have Oregon, *without a war*.

It is no longer ago than last year, that the British organs and many of the Whig presses predicted war with Mexico, war with England, in case Congress dared to accomplish the annexation of Texas; and now, when their false predictions *are still fresh in the minds of all*, they have the hardihood to make another attempt at intimidation. That the organs of British interests should perform the part which is prescribed to them, is to be expected; but it is certainly very strange that the Whig leaders and the Whig editors, especially those that are independent of British influence, should be so infatuated as to take sides with Great Britain against their own government, on questions of *national character*; they ought to know that our system of aggrandizement is entirely in harmony with our free institutions, and that, so far, it cannot be denied it has been effected *without war*. The very contexture of our institutions, and the working of *self-government* as it is with us form, altogether, a *new era in the history of nations*; and so is *our mode of aggrandizement*—other nations wage long wars, possibly for no other purpose than to take a few towns—we annex *immense territories* with no other instrument than the beacon of our institutions, and the *cordial good will of the People who inhabit them*.

Some other day, I will proceed to give an analytical statement of incontrovertible facts, which will convince any unprejudiced mind, that the *adoption by Congress* of the resolutions which passed the House of Representatives last winter, *will not produce war*; and I make bold to proclaim beforehand, that the course taken by President Polk, on the subject of our foreign relations, will be triumphantly sustained by the People of America.

No. I.

NEW YORK. November 25th, 1845.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

The Whig papers throughout the country have generally assumed that war, (immediate war, says the *Courier and Enquirer*,) will be declared by England in case Congress adopts the resolutions which last winter passed the House of Representatives on the subject of Oregon. I asserted in the *Daily Globe* of 15th inst., in an article headed "War and Oregon," that the threats thrown out against the tenour of those resolutions by the organs of British interests in this city, were part of a *concerted movement* on both sides of the Atlantic for the purpose of *intimidating Congress*, and I proceed to-day to give the first part of a detailed and analytical statement of facts, which will no doubt convince the unprejudiced reader that a war between the United States and England would, in a few years, lead inevitably to the *dismemberment of the British Empire*. This assertion will startle many; let those suspend their judgement until they have gone through the following elaborate analysis. In conclusion, I intend to establish by fair argument that the adoption by Congress of the Oregon resolutions does not afford England reasonable ground of complaint. Great Britain will try hard to bully us out of our rights, but when she finds out that we are resolved and united to stand by them, she will let us alone.

The analytical disquisition underneath was first published in Paris, in one of the daily papers of that metropolis, and formed part of a *brochure* in the French language. That language, on account of its clearness and perspicuity, is generally used by the statesmen of Europe for drawing out treaties and international stipulations; it is peculiarly adapted to subjects requiring close reasoning. I have done my best to be both clear and concise, but I apprehend that the following translation may not be altogether satisfactory to those who have read the original.

PARIS, February 22d, 1845.

What would be the Result, and the probable Consequences, of a War between the United States and England?

In order to treat this question with the serious deliberation that it deserves, it will be necessary to examine carefully what are the *elements* which constitute the power of the two nations, respectively, and what are the *principles* which impart action to the governmental strength of the two countries.

The available force that England can dispose of, for an aggressive war, has increased considerably since 1838. It was about that period when armed steamers were first built for the Royal Navy: the naval armament of Great Britain, has reached, at the present time, unmatched magnitude; and for efficiency to strike a blow on a sudden emergency, she has no rival in the world; and yet, on the other hand, England has never been in such a *precarious situation* as she would soon be, if she was to undertake a war with any maritime nation that could stand the first brunt, and protract the struggle for a few years. If such an occurrence was to happen, her situation would, indeed, be much more perilous than it ever was before 1815. This discrepancy will strike one at first as being very strange; but it is accounted for by the *material change* that has taken place in the principal element of her power. In order to appreciate fully the effect of that material change, it is incumbent to trace minutely the incipient beginning thereof—its progressive importance—its direct tendency, and the actual result.

From the year 1793 to 1815, at the time when the British Aristocracy were waging war against *revolutionary* France and against the French Emperor, the whole of English funds and capital was invested at home, chiefly in manufactories; the *monopoly* of manufacturing for all Europe was then the *principal element* of the power of England; there was not any other manufacturing nation on the continent, and the people thereof could not do without British manufactures; and although Napoleon tried his might to exclude them, they were in such request that they found their way to the continent, partly through smuggling, partly through the secret connivance of the authorities on the seaboard, and Napoleon himself was constrained, through absolute necessity, to adopt the system of granting licenses, and whenever the aggregate exportation of British goods was less, the profits were larger; England through these means was able to struggle until the time that the blunders of Napoleon enabled her, in 1813 and 1814, to literally overstock the whole continent with her goods, and to realize thereby enormous profits.

Meanwhile, a general peace took place in 1815, and the various nations of Europe, feeling no longer any apprehensions of war, turned their at-

tention to manufacturing, and within the short space of two or three years, the competition of these rising manufactories was more effective to curtail the gains of England, than had ever been the famous continental system of Napoleon; and while Europe was gradually getting over the evils of war, England was overtaken by a most violent commercial revulsion. The massacres of the operatives at Manchester took place in 1819, public order was threatened in many of the populous counties, conspiracies against the government were detected, a number of persons were hung for treason, civil war was rife, and the situation of the country, altogether, was, for some time, very critical.

The contrast that existed *then* between the situation of Great Britain and that of the other countries of Europe, exhibits in a most striking light the *artificial basis* upon which rests British prosperity; on the one hand, the various nations of the continent, in establishing manufactures for their own consumption, released themselves from paying tribute to England, and increased thereby essentially the welfare of the masses; while on the other, the working classes of Great Britain were reduced to the greatest wretchedness; and this took place almost as soon as she lost the *monopoly of manufacturers*; the principal element of her supremacy being thus impaired the superstructure of the British Empire was violently shaken, and while peace was a *blessing* to Europe, it was a *blight* to the system of the British Aristocracy.

This critical state of things, if it had lasted long, would have left no other remedy to the English people than that of rising *en masse* against the privileged class, and at once to put down a grasping Aristocracy that allows them the means of living merely, by encroaching on the just rights of other nations.

In the meantime, the revolt of the Spanish colonies had, since 1815, opened the whole of South America to British commerce, but the war that existed between Spain and her Colonies prevented this new market from being, at first, very profitable, but gradually an increase took place, part of the enormous capital that was *inert* in England on account of the prostration of business was invested in the New World by various companies, who thereby monopolized the valuable produce, and the rich mines of those extensive countries, and the immediate result of these operations was to relieve England from her critical situation: it was then that began the *material change* that has taken place in the principal element of her power; England did not discontinue manufacturing, but she became by degrees, pre-eminently a *loaning-money nation*—I mean a nation *loaning on pledges*; it was by loaning money to the governments of Mexico, of Peru, of Columbia, of Chili, of Brazils, &c., &c., than England obtained exclusive privileges, mortgages on the land and on the revenue, special treaties of commerce, and lastly, a spirited revival of her transactions with Europe, which she laid under contribution by supplying it with the various productions of South America.

The system of loaning in foreign lands having been adopted *through necessity*, and the allurements of *high interests* stimulating besides British cupidity, things have come to that pass that from one to two hundred millions of dollars have been loaned in the United States without obtaining any pledge of a national character, unless it be admitted that the advantage of corrupting thereby part of the population may be considered

as such; and progressively, all the capitalists of England, including, of course, the aristocracy (viz., the rulers of the country,) without hardly an exception, have invested their funds, either in foreign lands or in foreign speculations and undertakings: the natural consequence of adopting that system on such a gigantic scale, is to render the whole world tributary to England, but in case of war with a maritime nation powerful enough to protract the contest for two or three years, it is self-evident that the *now* principal element of her supremacy would be in most imminent jeopardy; and by reverting to the critical situation of Great Britain from 1817 to 1819, when the *then* principal element of her power became impaired by losing part of the monopoly of manufactures, we may form an adequate idea, if a long war were to take place, of the shock and injury that would be inflicted on an empire whose superstructure, at this present time, is raised on transacting the commerce, and regulating the finances of the whole world.

Anterior to 1815, the *monopoly of manufactures* enabled England to wage war against France by subsidizing some of the continental powers, and she thereby succeeded in keeping the whole of Europe in continental strife: but now, in case of an obstinate war, her extensive loans to foreign countries would be completely exposed to exterior casualties; and let it be borne in mind, that all the riches, all the produce, all the tribute, that every tide wafts to her shores, has become absolutely necessary, even for keeping up her *peace* establishment. The false and iniquitous system upon which her greatness is established, requires, at all times, a standing army of mercenaries, and numerous fleets in all parts of the world, ready to crush down at once all rising resistance to her oppression, and if her already enormous expenditure was to be greatly swelled on account of war, at the same time that her receipts would be materially curtailed, it is easy to conceive that it would try hard the cohesion of the British empire. Even now, in time of peace, she cannot get rid of her income tax, that used to be laid formerly only in time of war; and it has been affirmed last year in Parliament, by ministerial members, that to grant two hours of rest to the wretched children whose life is being shortened by being bound to toil from 12 to 16 hours in the factories, would put in great danger the supremacy, and even the existence of Great Britain.

The principles that impart action to the governmental strength of Great Britain, proceed from the impulse given by a vigorous and talented Aristocracy, whose untired and united efforts concentrate at one point, viz., inordinate aggrandizement: they number but a few hundred individuals, and the greatest part of the land belongs to them, *by entail*. That *privileged caste* whose members die, but whose Michiavelian spirit is invariably caught and sustained by those who take their place, has, since the revolution of 1688, persevered without intermission in its encroaching views, going to war or making peace, according to circumstances, but in all cases consulting only its own selfish interest, without caring for justice, otherwise than in wordy professions;* and by spoliating, suc-

* By the time the reader will have read this article through, he will understand the reason why the British Aristocracy has been so pacific in their transactions with the *great* powers of the world for these last fifteen to twenty years, while previous to 1815 they took every opportunity to embroil Europe in long wars; their *principles* remain the same, but their *interests* have materially *changed* since they have become *wholesale money lenders*.

The pretended division of British Aristocracy in two parties denominated the Whig

cessively, Spain, France, Holland, Portugal, India, China, &c., she has succeeded to raise up a gigantic empire, whereof, Manufactures, Commerce, and Finances, are the *three* fundamental parts. Paper money has been the contrivance that has been used to give a monopolizing extension to these three organic parts, and it has been accomplished by raising the wind with promises to pay, to the amount of £800,000,000! and the due payment of the interest of that enormous debt is a powerful hold on the good behaviour of the actual creditors. The branches of that overgrown Empire have by degrees spread all over the world; but the basis remains the same, and instead of increasing in strength, it has grown weaker, particularly for the last twenty-five years that England has been investing, and involving out of the country, the *principal organic element* of that basis, becoming thereby pre-eminently, as I have before stated, a *nation loaning money on pledges*.

The logical inferences of the preceding elaborate exposition, are now easy to be drawn, and it becomes a matter of evidence that a maritime war of a few years between the United States and England would have the following results, so far as concerns Great Britain.

The revenue, interests, dividends, tribute, that she now collects from all parts of the world, would fall short more or less—her maritime commerce would be partly ruined by privateers—the immense market of the United States for the purchase of the raw materials, and for the outlet of her fabrics would be closed against her—her manufactures could no longer stand a competition with those of France, of Germany, of Switzerland, and of those of the continent in general.

It becomes, thus, self-evident, that the fundamental parts of the British Empire would be materially impaired, and by giving way, the whole superstructure would tumble into fragments.

An analysis of the elements of the power of the United States will be the subject of the next article.

and the Tory party, is a mere gull-trap to deceive the people into the belief that there are some patriots among them; it has the advantage, besides, whenever they find that a change of measures becomes necessary, to enable them to do it with good grace by letting the Whigs or the Tories, as the case may be, to take the administration of affairs in opposition to their sham opponents.

The Tories are generally the most violent and warlike, and the Whigs are the most liberal and pacific. But in some cases the character of the party is inverted, as it was, for instance, under the Whig administration of Melbourne and Palmerston.

The increase of the influence of France in the Mediterranean, and particularly the independent course of the Pacha of Egypt in 1839 and 1840, were galling to the feelings of the British Aristocracy, and threatened to blight their long-cherished plan of connecting their East India Empire with Europe by controlling Egypt from the Red Sea to Alexandria. Ibrahim Pacha was in full march on Constantinople; there was no time to lose for preparing a change of tactics. So the Whig Administration played the part of the Tories, and they did so admirably; they framed the treaty of the Quadruple Alliance, landed in Syria, check-mated Ibrahim, settled the affairs of Turkey and Egypt in their own way, gave a terrible kick to their good friend Louis Philippe, whom Lord Palmerston publicly declared he could at any time shove through the eye of a needle. Following up the encroaching policy, they sent an armament to China, slaughtered the defenceless Chinese, took their ports, their bullion, and as high a tribute as they could extort. The boldness of these movements gave a general alarm to all Europe; but British Aristocracy knows when to push on and when to stop—they found that the pear was not quite ripe, a change of policy became necessary, and the Tories as meek as lambs, took the place of the Whigs.

No. II

PARIS, March 2d, 1843.

What would be the Result, and the Probable Consequences, of a War between the United States and England?

I proceed, to-day, to investigate the reasons, the causes, and the circumstances, that will enable the United States to sustain a long and obstinate war; and, moreover, to analyze their means of resistance against the immense aggressive means of Great Britain.

The principal *element* of the force and ascendancy of the American Republic consists in the peculiar energy of the Yeomanry of the country, united to the immense territorial resources it controls, and to the advantages it holds forth to the oppressed population of the despotic Governments of Europe. In England, the owners by entail of the greatest portion of the land, count up a few *hundreds*—in the United States they number *millions*. Those millions of Freemen, in the strongest sense of the word, are inured to hardships by daily labour in the open air, and they take hold with equal skill, as circumstances require, the plough, the axe, or the rifle; they would fight in defence of the soil that belongs to them with an intelligence and a tenacity not to be found in any other country. The regular army of the Republican Americans does not exceed nine thousand men.* They are conscious of their strength—and the inviolability of the soil is safely entrusted to the well-known devotion of the masses to a form of government, whereof every individual constitutes a part, and which every individual has a personal interest to sustain.

There are about a million of citizen soldiers in the United States, annually drilled to militia duty, and two millions—if it was necessary—would take up arms to defend their institutions, their homes, and their lands, against foreign invasion. The deadly aim of the American rifle has become proverbial; it was fully demonstrated at New Orleans, in 1815, when a few thousand of the militia from Tennessee and Kentucky, with a few hundreds of French sailors, totally routed 15,000 men, said to be, at the time, the choicest troops of the British army. It was proclaimed by the British organs in America, when these fifteen thousand men landed, that they were “the conquerors of the conquerors of Europe.” They were actually part of the British army which had invaded France, under Wellington, in 1814. This remarkable victory is not an exceptionable case; the battle of St. Jacynth was fought, with a similar result: about seven hundred of American adventurers completely cut to pieces the Mexican army of Santa Anna, 6,000 strong.

On the seaboard the United States have nothing serious to apprehend from England—the means of transportation are so rapid and efficient, through numberless steamers and railroads, which traverse the country in all directions, that there is not a single spot from Boston to New Orleans but where 60 to 80 thousand men might be concentrated in the short

* This was the total number when I left America in 1843: I find now, by the late Report of the War Department, that it has been reduced to 6,500 men.

space of two or three weeks; the British, it is true, might land; they might possibly destroy one or two of the large cities on the Atlantic; it is a game, however, they will be slow to undertake, for the loss that would ensue thereby to the British commerce and to British interests would be nearly as heavy as that of the Americans. They might, according to their usual warfare, burn a few towns, but they would soon be compelled to make their escape to their ships, their numbers greatly diminished by death, the prisoners taken from them, and the *missing*; the British soldiers know well, and their desertion from Canada to the United States, at the peril of their lives, proves it frequently, that the Democratic institutions of the United States, and a few acres of land to make themselves independent, are more conducive to their welfare than the *flogging* they receive now and then, to encourage them to sustain the *glory of Old England*.

On the north, northeast, and northwest frontiers of the United States, England might act with much better chance of success; the *passage* which she has obtained through the State of Maine by the Ashburton treaty* has made her position in North America truly formidable; it enables her to send troops to Canada in the heart of winter—it increases incalculably her means of organizing and planning aggressive excursions against the frontier towns on the lakes, and whenever the depredatory troops would meet with effectual resistance they might fall back on their fortified points, &c. The United States would, no doubt, perceive the dangerous consequences that would ensue of communication being kept up actively between Halifax and England through the means of steamers; they might be averted by collecting a large force and marching it, on the first intimation of hostilities, into Nova Scotia, for the purpose of taking Halifax, if possible—if not, to blockade it strictly by land, proclaiming at once the independence of Canada. But it must be admitted that the American militia, although superiour to any other when defending their own soil, are deficient for an offensive war. Let us concede the worst. Let us suppose that England would hold her own in Canada, and that her emissaries should succeed to stir up the Indian tribes against the United States—it cannot be denied but that such a cruel border war would inflict very great individual misery, but no farther advantage would accrue to Great Britain; it would not enable the English troops to penetrate successfully into the United States. Any British General that would leave the protection of the fortified camps on the frontiers, and make an attempt to advance into the interior of the Union, would meet the fate of Burgoyne, who was taken prisoner at Saratoga, in 1777, with 8,000 men. The one hundred and seventy thousand citizen soldiers of the State of New York, acting in concert with the hardy yeomanry of Maine, of New Hampshire, of Vermont, and of Michigan, could effectually annihilate or scatter any force the British might muster in North America.

At the south England would very likely try to stir up the blacks to rise up against the whites. It is doubtful whether they could succeed;

* It enables England to keep Canada connected at all times with her other scattered provinces in North America. Before the Ashburton Treaty, Canada was without direct intercourse, seven months out of twelve, except through the United States. The disgraceful concession that has been made by yielding such an important passage is clearly and forcibly demonstrated in the French *brochure*, wherefrom the above is a translation: it will be the subject of a separate article.

were they able, however, to do it, the Southern States would then be, no doubt, the theatre of a frightful slaughter; but the general exasperation that such a horrible act would excite all over the country, would settle the question at once. *Peace with England would become impossible, so long as she would own an inch of ground in North America.*

On land, Great Britain has no chance to force her terms on the American Republic. At sea, she might, it is admitted, destroy materially her maritime commerce; but although maritime commerce has been greatly conducive to the prosperity of the United States, it is by no means an indispensable element of their existence; it may, indeed, be asserted, that there is no country on the globe that could so easily dispense with foreign commerce as the United States, considering that the Union has within itself such a variety of productions and raw materials, of territorial resources, and of manufactories withal, whose business would increase materially by getting rid of English competition. However, even at sea, the United States have, in the last war, from 1812 to 1815, beard the British Leopard, and the changes and modifications that the introduction of steam-power in the navy will produce in a maritime war, would be *mostly* to the advantage of America. A strict blockade of the coast would be nearly impracticable—steam fireships might be stationed at the mouth and entrance of every river and harbour—British cruisers would have to keep away at a distance, and the numerous fleet of fine sailing packets in port, might be fitted out as privateers, and would have a rare chance to make depredations on British commerce on every sea. England would, no doubt, send, *at the outset*, a powerful armament of her armed steamers; but England has so many places to guard and protect, that it would be impossible even for her to keep up, for any length of time, on such extensive coasts, a sufficient force to be able to resist the steam fireships that might issue from every creek and outlet, at every favourable opportunity; and thereby the blockading force might be, night and day, *threatened with total destruction.*

The reader is by this time, no doubt, satisfied that the United States are able to sustain a long and obstinate war against Great Britain; but in order to dispose of this question logically, I will proceed to explain the *principles* that impart action to the governmental strength of the United States. According to the federal contract, the various States have reserved to themselves all the powers which have not been delegated in clear and precise terms, to the General Government. The Constitution, it is true, delegates to Congress the right of declaring war; but even that power is never used, but when a large majority of electors (that is to say, a large majority of the nation) is actually in its favour; the necessity of a large majority being needed to warrant a declaration of war, proceeds from this simple fact, "that all the powers emanate directly from a majority of the people." Under such a system, an unjust war can hardly ever be attempted, and it accounts for the forbearance of the American Administration from 1805 to 1812. They protested against the indignities that Great Britain was heaping on American citizens; but Congress bore them for seven years, and war was deliberately and coolly declared, only when a large majority of the nation became aroused to the necessity of avenging their wrongs. That war, of course, was national, and the rank and file of the Federalist party, whose leaders fiercely opposed it,

rallied round the majority. At this present time, many of the influential leaders of the Whig party are closely connected with British interests and with British capitalists; these individuals, acting in concert with the numerous class of speculators, use their influence over the presses under their control, and leave no means untried to promote indirectly the views of Great Britain against the annexation of Texas, &c. Some of these do so in the hope of being able to contract some new loans in England, for the purpose of going on, as they say, with what they call internal improvements; but the most that the opposition of these men proves, is, that there are selfish men in America, the same as in other countries; but if war was actually to take place, many of these ego-tists would become the most inveterate enemies of Great Britain; they would try to make up their anticipated gains by fitting out privateers against British commerce, with the hope of filling their pockets therefrom; and the popular feeling of the two great American parties, in case of war, would fully agree upon this point—to make one great effort to exclude England altogether from the American continent.

The summing up of the juxtaposition of facts above minutely exposed, may now be made briefly, and the underneath inferences must appear irresistible.

A declaration of war by Great Britain against the United States, on account of the annexation of Texas, or else, on account of the projected occupancy of Oregon, according to the resolutions adopted in the House of Representatives, would be a war of a *minority* government, resting on an *artificial* basis, whereof the three organic and fundamental parts are more or less exposed to be *impaired*, against a *majority* government, the strength whereof proceeds direct from the cordial adhesion of the masses, which government is supported, *particularly*, by the energy and intelligence of an *agricultural population* of nearly three millions of freemen, whose territorial resources and means of living, are beyond the reach of British aggression.

The inevitable result of such a war, carried on with animosity for a number of years, must be

THE DISMEMBERMENT OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE, SUCH AS IT IS NOW CONSTITUTED.

The consequences that would naturally ensue, from such an event, would be the following:

THE ULTIMATE TRIUMPH OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, WHOSE BENEFICENT EXPANSION WOULD DIFFUSE ITS BENEFITS ON A MUCH ENLARGED SCALE.

THE REGENERATION AND ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE POPULAR MASSES OF IRELAND, ENGLAND, AND SCOTLAND; WHO, BY SHAKING OFF THE YOKE OF A GRASPING AND MACHIAVELIAN OLIGARCHY, WOULD THEREBY IMPROVE THEIR SITUATION, BY BEING NO LONGER REDUCED, EITHER TO BE PAUPERS, OR TO TOIL INCESSANTLY FOR A WRETCHED PITTANCE, IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY GIVE TO THEIR OPPRESSORS THE MEANS OF MONOPOLIZING ALTOGETHER, THE COMMERCE, THE FINANCES, THE POLICE, AND THE ESPIONAGE OF THE WHOLE WORLD.

NEW YORK, December 4th, 1845.

No impartial person of common understanding can rise from reading with attention this translation of the French *brochure*, without assenting to its conclusions. The writer thereof proceeds minutely through the whole article with logical precision, tracing events to their incipient causes; and he is particularly careful not to draw any inference until it is warranted by preceding reasoning or statements. All the facts brought forward are matter of history, and the writer has classed and grouped them with such clearness and force, that there is no resisting the evidence.

In corroboration of the views exposed in the French *brochure*, I herewith transcribe an extract from the *London Globe* of the 11th of February last, in an article headed "Fortifications of London": "But England cannot afford an invasion, her power is based upon commercial greatness, upon commercial security, and faith, and confidence; let those be shaken and the whole fabric falls."

No. III.

NEW YORK, December 13, 1846.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

Preparatory to resuming my remarks on the above question, I subjoin underneath the strictures on the Ashburton Treaty, which I adverted to in the last number.

PARIS, January 20th, 1845.

The Ashburton Treaty, and the Reasons why it has made the Annexation of Texas popular in the United States.

The news lately received from the United States, represent the popular feeling in favour of the annexation of Texas as daily gaining ground; the impulse that produces it, proceeds from a cause that begins to be felt in the Northern States, although that cause has not yet been publicly divulged. The reasons why the American press has been silent thereupon, will be easily seen through on reading the following explanation. It is now given in France, for the purpose of refuting, at once, the daily abuse belched out by the British press, concerning what it calls the *grasping ambition* of the United States; the cause alluded to is briefly explained underneath.

The Ashburton Treaty has enabled England to assume a threatening, and a truly formidable attitude on the Northern and Northwestern frontiers of the Federal Union. The new position created by that treaty, enables her to stir up, on a great scale, the whole of the Indian nations and tribes which have been of late years mostly concentrated West of the Mississippi, many of them with hostile feelings against the United States. Admitting the assertion as to the effect of the treaty to be true, it will be easily conceived, by looking over a chart of America, how important it is to prevent Great Britain from extending her *protection* to Texas, and from cementing with that country a connexion akin to the one she established formerly with Portugal; it would, undoubtedly, en-

able her to *control* altogether the Gulf of Mexico; and it would give her an entering wedge to scatter her emissaries among the Indian tribes as far up as lake Michigan, and thereby encircle with enemies the whole of the Western frontier of the Union from North to South, which enemies would rise up at her bidding; and in order to demonstrate the strict truth of the above assertion, as to the dangerous consequences of the Ashburton Treaty, I am going to set forth, as clearly and as forcibly as I possibly can, the position of England before the treaty, and compare it with what it is now, and what it may be within a short time.

In the month of November, 1837, a general rising of the people of Canada took place against the Colonial Government. The river St. Lawrence was then bound in icy fetters, and the news reached England through the United States, as no part of Canada can be approached from sea in winter time. Halifax, in Nova Scotia, is the only harbour that has a free communication with England all the year round; but Halifax, before the Ashburton Treaty, could not communicate with Canada, on account of a strip of land belonging to the State of Maine, which stretched so far North in those uncultivated and dreary regions as to prevent the possibility of its being turned. The result was, that England, notwithstanding her large standing army and her numerous fleets, could not send a single regiment to strengthen the garrison. The St. Lawrence did not open until the end of the month of May, and England would no doubt have lost, forever, her colony; if local causes* had not enabled the Colonial Government to get over their adversaries without any material aid from the metropolis.

Anterior to the Ashburton Treaty, the Northern and Western frontiers of the Union were comparatively safe, as, in case of war, Canada was actually cut out from England seven months out of twelve. It was then annually dependant on the United States for supplies and intelligence from abroad—that is, from the month of November to the month of May. The Ashburton Treaty has brought about a complete change. That part of the State of Maine which England had been so long coveting, for the purpose of opening a short and easy communication between Halifax and Canada, having been given up to her by the United States, a military road has already been completed; a railway is even talked of, and now, the British Minintry can send *direct*, despatches, emissaries, ammunitions, troops, &c., whenever it suits them, in winter as well as in summer. It must be taken into consideration, besides, that England keeps in North America; *since the treaty*, a garrison of twelve thousand men, which is nearly *double* the number of the whole regular American army, while in 1837 she had hardly three thousand! England has now completed such a compact and powerful organization in Canada, that she can, through the means of her steam navy on the Lakes, annoy and harass the American Union on a frontier extending three thousand miles.

But what ought to be considered the most dangerous features of this new position, is the rapidity wherewith instructions may be transmitted from London to Montreal. Celerity in war movements is well known to be the most energetic promoter of success, and the British Ministers might now, in the space of a few weeks, organize a plan of operations

* These causes will be explained in a separate article. The general purport thereof will be to give an insight into the foreign policy of Mr. Van Buren.

with the incalculable advantage of being able to superintend its execution, details, and progress, almost daily, from Downing street, in London, through expeditious steamers from England to Halifax; and the whole available force of Great Britain might thus be brought to act wherever it would be thought to be the most effective.

The Colonial authorities in Canada succeeded last war, with limited means, to stir up against the Americans some of the Indian tribes, which waged on the borders a war of extermination, without distinction of age or sex. Now that we can appreciate the extent and efficiency of the means at the disposal of England, we may form some idea of the extension she might give to such a cruel and barbarous warfare. Well, if England, over and above the powerful means that the Ashburton Treaty has supplied her with, was to succeed besides to draw Texas under her protection, and was thereby, as a matter of course, to *control the Gulf of Mexico*, she might, it appears obvious, stir up simultaneously an Indian war all along the extensive Western frontiers, and at the same time, a war of revolted slaves at the South; which war of all others, is the most dangerous to the American Confederacy. To break asunder the Republican Union, has been the secret aim at which British machinations have been directed ever since 1815.* This is the aim she had in view when she lavished so much money to abolish slavery in her Colonies on the Coast of America.

It is needless, no doubt, to enter into further developments. Every intelligent reader understands now the reasons why the Annexation of Texas has become so popular. The Ashburton Treaty has made it an event of sheer necessity for the *protection of the American Confederacy*; so much so, indeed, that many individuals in the Northern States, who at first opposed annexation on account of honest and conscientious scruples about slavery, admit, now, after a more comprehensive view of the subject, the urgency of immediate annexation.

But many people will probably exclaim, how is it that the American Government has been drawn into the discreditable cession of a passage whereof the consequences might be so disastrous? I confine myself to-day to prove the fact†—the following remarks will, however, account for the silence of the American press. The *fed Attorney of Baring & Co.* was Secretary of State, and was the American negotiator of the disgraceful treaty. President Tyler‡ was so situated with his Whig

* Reasons in support of the above assertion will be found in an article hereafter, to be published under the head of "Origin of Slavery in the United States, and the most suitable means to promote its gradual abolition."

† The original causes which have led to this discreditable cession, may be traced up to the administration of Mr. Van Buren, and will be distinctly developed in the next article.

‡ In justice to Mr. Tyler, I am led to append herewith the following comment: When the British Ministers found that General Harrison was elected President, and that Mr. Webster was to be Secretary of State, they lost no time, and availed themselves at once of the golden opportunity, by appointing at once a plenipotentiary to settle the Northeastern Boundary: they knew that they could get what they wanted by sending a *proper* man; and, therefore, a *banker* came over to this country, with full powers, &c. The death of Harrison had like to spoil the contemplated arrangement, as Mr. Tyler, in his inaugural, assumed a tone on the subject of our foreign relations very different from *that* taken by the good-natured Harrison within the short space of a month; and Mr. Webster had to use a great deal of management to get the

Cabinet, that he was drawn into signing it—over two-thirds of both the Whig and Democratic Senators were equally guilty in voting for its ratification. Most of the influential presses took sides in its favour, some of them biased by their political leaders, others through mere corrupt influence.* Those circumstances, and the general *disgust* they created, explain the sullen silence of the great mass of the community on that infamous treaty.

NEW YORK, December 14th, 1845.

The feeling of *disgust* whereto the French *brochure* attributes, truly, the silence of the American public would have prevented me from publishing the above translation, had I not had, at the present time, an important object in view. The motives that have influenced the course of Daniel Webster, are understood by every unprejudiced mind, and it meets the reprobation of every well-thinking man—it is, therefore, useless, to cavil about it—but what I want to expatiate upon, is, *the course of the American Senate*.

The strictures on the course of the Senate I will give in another number, in which I will quote a remark made to me by Mr. King, (Ambassador at Paris,) as to the reasons which induced Southern Senators to vote for the treaty.

The article underneath was published in the *Daily Globe* on the 23d of December:

NO. IV.

NEW YORK, December 21, 1845.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

Previous to summing up argument on this exciting question, it appears proper to set forth before the reader, all the information that has a material

consent of the new President. The disgrace of giving up to Great Britain the important passage she was coveting, could not be brooked by Mr. Tyler without obtaining some concession that might, at least, seem equivalent. Accordingly, to save appearances, the navigation of the St. John river, and a strip of land in Canada, were conceded to the United States; it had the advantage, besides, of giving to Mr. Webster an argument, which he might and did use in the Senate, in addressing those who opposed the treaty: "you complain that we have given up our territory; well, Great Britain, for the sake of compromise, has also, on her side, given up to us part of her territory," &c.; and to this day, whenever the Ashburton Treaty is held up as a reproach on our negotiator, the partisans of Mr. Webster will not fail to tell you: "Read what the loyalists of Canada say concerning the treaty; there is an outcry that the British Ministry have sacrificed the honour of the country, &c. Such way of reasoning has an effect on the many who take no trouble to form an opinion for themselves, but it does not invalidate the fact—the stubborn fact—namely, that England, through that treaty, has been enabled to perfect such a formidable and compact an organization as to change altogether the former relative position of the two countries, while the advantages which have accrued to the United States from that treaty, are, in comparison, entirely insignificant. See note 3 of article No. 8.

* I have been told, as a positive fact, by a person well situated to know it, that a certain editor in this city (whose paper has a great circulation) received from a British functionary, now in Canada, five hundred dollars as a *douceur*, to influence his editorials on the subject of the Northeastern Boundary.

bearing thereupon ; last Wednesday, I produced in the *Daily Globe*, the translation of a remarkable article on the Ashburton Treaty, which was first published in Paris in a daily paper called *La Reforme* ; this has been done with a view of setting forth in a strong light the *course of the Senate* concerning their ratification of that disgraceful treaty : it is not a pleasing task to expose publicly the unsound views and principles which influenced the votes of over two-thirds of our Senators, but it becomes necessary to do so at the present juncture of our national affairs, when a similar course might be attended with still worse result.

The President of the United States has lately sent to the world a message, wherein he has expressed opinions and recommendations on the subject of our foreign relations, which emphatically embody the popular feeling of the Republic. The House of Representatives, will, no doubt, sustain the President in the stand he has taken in maintaining our claim on the Oregon territory, as well as in opposing any attempt at Colonization on this continent by European powers ; but the organs of British interests appear to be confident that a majority of Senators will refuse their consent to such measures, that might give offence to Great Britain. If such is to be the course of the Senate, then, indeed, apprehensions of war might spring up therefrom.

The elaborate analysis of the elements of the power of Great Britain, which is the subject of No. 1 of this pamphlet, demonstrates, I trust, conclusively, that England, notwithstanding her immense means of aggression, has never been in such a *precarious situation* as she is now, to prosecute a *protracted* maritime war. But if the British Ministers perceive that our councils are distracted—if, moreover, they acquired the conviction that they might enforce their terms by striking a blow, that blow would be struck instantly, and without hesitation, entirely regardless of "our common Anglo-Saxon origin," of kindred ties, and of all the pathos exhaled by those who profess a holy horror of war ; which fustian, if it was to influence our counsels, would have the effect of producing that very war which it is meant to deprecate. I do not apprehend, however, that the British Ministers will have any such conviction ; they are fully aware of their weak points, and they appreciate the imminent risk they might incur, with much greater accuracy than it is generally done on this side the Atlantic. Their apprehension of the consequences of a war with the United States, is a sure guarantee that peace will be unbroken on the part of England. It is, nevertheless, very important, that the measures proposed by the President should be promptly and cordially supported by the Senate. The sooner Great Britain is convinced that we will present an undivided front, the sooner all appearances of war will vanish ; and our Senators should be careful to eschew, at this present juncture, the unsound views and principles which influenced the vote of many Senators on the Ashburton Treaty. I will proceed, now, to expound the *course of the Senate* on their ratification of said treaty.

The very day that I published in Paris the French *brochure* that I have partly translated, I took it to Mr. King, the American Ambassador. I knew he was in the Senate at the time the Ashburton Treaty was under discussion, but, was doubtful, as to what had been his vote for the ratification thereof ; being particularly desirous to ascertain his opinion, I read to him the whole of the article on the Ashburton Treaty, and laid

peculiar emphasis on the following sentence—"The Whig and Democratic Senators were equally guilty in voting for its ratification." Mr. King, with a degree of candour, highly honourable to him, made, *verbatim*, the following remarks—"I voted for the Treaty, and I must say, *I am very sorry for it.*" A short pause followed, and then he added—"Massachusetts and Maine, which were most interested, gave their consent;" the last words of the sentence I do not recollect distinctly, but I recollect well the purport thereof, which was, that the Southern Senators considered the Northeastern Boundary a sectional question, &c.* The consent of Massachusetts and Maine was thus considered, it appears, by many Senators, of sufficient weight in itself to induce them to give their votes in favour of a treaty which affected, eminently, vital interests to the whole of the Union. As to the consent of Massachusetts, I will merely remark, that the men who held, and hold now, the political power of that State, were and are exceedingly anxious at all times to do every thing that may be agreeable to their friend John Bull—but how was the consent of Maine obtained? The noble-minded Fairfield, who is now in the Senate, might tell his associates all the particulars which preceded and influenced that consent. He might disclose to them that Mr. Van Buren wheedled him to withdraw his volunteers from the 'vantage ground they had gained over the British—he might whisper to them, that the promises of the ex-President, as to cause the disputed territory to be respected by the British, proved to be allacious—he might assert, that both Houses of Congress, with great unanimity, had voted and delegated to the Executive, ample means and power for the purpose of sustaining our clear and unquestionable rights, and that said Executive basely betrayed them. Governor Fairfield might declare, that the State of Maine had incurred a debt of five to six hundred thousand dollars to sustain national claims, which he found were in progress of being sacrificed by the General Government. He might divulge, that the American negotiator offered to *buy* the consent of the authorities of Maine, by paying to them, out of the Treasury of the Union, the amount of expenses they had so promptly incurred, nobly actuated by a keen sense of national patriotism. Finally, he might confess that the commissioners and authorities of Maine made up their minds to accept the *bargain* that was pressed upon them, *only* when they found they had no other chance to be assisted by the General Government. Such was the way that the consent of Maine was obtained, and the Senators who voted for the treaty must have been aware of all the facts above detailed. I do not doubt that many gave their votes with reluctance, and that they did so under the mistaken apprehension that war would have been the result of the rejection of the treaty; but those who gave their votes under the plea that the consent of Massachusetts and Maine was of sufficient weight to give up a passage whereof the consequences may be so disastrous to the whole Confederacy, acted under a principle derogatory to the plain duty of the Senator; specially in his acts as part of the Executive power of the United States, he ought, when deliberating in that capacity, to divest himself from all *sectional* feeling, and give his vote with a sole view of its being conducive to the welfare of the whole Union.

* Mr. King admitted, in terms of high praise, the correctness of the views expressed in the French *brochure*; and he told me the next time I saw him, that he had sent it to Mr. Buchanan, Secretary of State.

Although *disgust* has prevented the people of the United States from making any public demonstration against the course of the Senate on the Ashburton Treaty, it must not be supposed that it is forgotten; a proper tone of national feeling is gaining ground, and is penetrating the masses throughout the country; and those Senators who may take upon themselves to vote according to *sectional* feeling on the Oregon resolutions, and other questions, which will shortly be under debate, will find out, in time, the truth of my assertion.

The arrival of the Acadia furnishes us with extracts from various influential organs of the British Aristocracy, extolling to the skies a late speech of Daniel Webster, recommending the giving up of all claims on the Oregon territory, &c., and they agree in manifesting the pleasure it would give them to see "the great expounder" appointed as negotiator for the Northwestern Boundary. No wonder they should like such a negotiator; they have had already a foretaste of his *accommodating spirit*, in the Ashburton Treaty; many of those influential presses, particularly the *Times*, intimate views which perfectly coincide with those already expressed in the Whig papers in this city: they hope that the *Senate* will *check* the popular feeling, and that Mr. Calhoun will interpose his influence in order that "masterly inactivity" might prevail. At the time Mr. Calhoun recommended "masterly inactivity," it might have been a wise measure; but the time has passed by, and Mr. Calhoun is no doubt aware of it. Mr. Calhoun, as Secretary of State, sustained our claims on the whole of Oregon with transcendent ability;* but Mr. Calhoun has voted for the Ashburton Treaty, and he is suspected of being rather *sectional* in his views. Some people insinuate that his zeal for maintaining our claims on Oregon will not equal *that* which he displayed for effecting Texas annexation; I hope that this insinuation will prove entirely groundless.

An attentive reading of the articles published in the *Daily Globe* on the 15th and 26th ult., and 6th inst., on the question "Will there be War," &c., will carry with it a conviction that the passage, by Congress, of the Oregon resolutions, *will not produce war*; but an emergency may arise in another quarter, that might be, within two or three years, a certain cause of hostilities; the explication of that emergency will be the subject of a separate article.

NO. V.

NEW YORK, December 24th, 1845.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

To the Editor of the *Globe*:

In your paper of yesterday I made this remark, that an attentive perusal of the series of articles you have published for me, on the question "Will there be War?" would carry with it a conviction that the passage, by Congress, of the Oregon resolutions, *will not produce war*, but

* It will be recollected that Mr. Webster, in a vehement speech, maintained in Congress that our claim on the whole Maine territory was unquestionable, and that we ought to take possession of the disputed territory on the 4th of July. I do not mean by

that, however, an *emergency* may arise from another quarter, which might be, within two or three years, a positive cause of hostilities.

England has, for some time past, cast a wistful eye on California: it is much more important to her views of aggrandizement than would be that part of Oregon which is south of the Columbia river. *Possibly* a treaty has already been concluded with Mexico for the cession to Great Britain of that fine country. Should that be the case, an English fleet is already more than half way to the Pacific, for the purpose of taking immediate possession thereof. If such be the course of events, no doubt but that considerable trepidation has been felt by the British Aristocracy, previous to making up their minds to take such a decisive step—they are aware that the dismemberment of the British empire is at stake, if a protracted war takes place; but they know, on the other hand, that the federate form of this government is a great impediment to a foreign war, which requires principally celerity and decision; moreover, the apprehension that the United States might purchase California, may have spurred them to act before having proper time to ponder well the consequences, and *possibly* they may deceive themselves into the belief that prompt action, and actual possession by treaty, would distract the councils of the United States, and would thereby prevent any serious opposition.

Taking the above premises as granted, the British Ministers would, no doubt, send all their available force in Canada and on the Coast of America, for the purpose of watching our movements, and of fomenting the spirit of party, by exciting the zeal of the numerous partizans of British interests throughout the country. Such a course, a few years ago, might have proved successful to prevent hostilities from the United States, but I make bold to say, that it would *now* prove a failure; extensive preparations would be made in the United States—Great Britain would soon find that we would be in earnest in preparing for war; and then the question arises, whether she would not, at once, commence hostilities; her stake is so great that she might hesitate for a length of time, but war would be only delayed thereby, for the United States, acting conformably to what was done in 1812, would coolly and deliberately declare it, as soon as the national feeling would become united on its necessity, which might make two or three years.

The subject of the next article will be a disquisition on the probable effect of the President's Message in Europe.

No. VI.

NEW YORK, December 29th, 1845.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

We have now reports from nearly all parts of the United States as to the effect produced by the Message of the President. An almost universal burst of popular approbation has responded to the clearness of its

this allusion, to insinuate that Mr. Calhoun might back out in the *same way* that Mr. Webster did: I mean to say, that there is a difference between an able advocacy of a claim, and an energetic zeal to enforce it.

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exposition, to the true American spirit and patriotism which it displays throughout, and to the soundness of the principles laid down therein as a basis for our foreign and national policy. It has silenced, *for a while*, the opponents of the Administration, and many of them have even gone so far as to express themselves satisfied with confiding the care of our foreign relations to the *prudence* of an Executive, whom only a few weeks ago they were villifying at a great rate, applying to him such epithets as "rabid," "unprincipled," &c.

My purpose, in introducing to-day the subject of the President's Message, is to investigate its probable effect in Europe. Will it be received with the same manifestation of hostile feelings as was the Inaugural? The solving of this question will require some preliminary remarks.

On the 12th of April last, I published in *La Reforme*, one of the daily Parisian papers, an article * headed, "Threats of the British Aristocracy on the subject of Oregon," wherein I asserted that the warlike denunciation that was made on the 4th of the same month in the British Parliament, by both shades of the Aristocracy, on account, as was pretended, of the language of President Polk in his Inaugural, on the subject of Oregon, was actually nothing else than a theatrical demonstration, which had been concerted for the purpose of intimidating the American Government—of fomenting the spirit of party throughout the Union, being intended, particularly, for insulting the President from the support of the people. We have now a Message from Mr. Polk, taking stronger ground than the Inaugural on the subject of Oregon, (as I will show in its proper place when reviewing the Message,) asserting, besides, principles of international law which will be most galling to the British Aristocracy, and to their vassals, Messrs. Guizot & Co. If the language of the President on the subject of Oregon, in his Inaugural, had been the *real* cause of the warlike demonstration which took place last April, we ought, of course, to expect a complete outbreak. Well, I venture to assert, beforehand, that the tone of the British Parliament will be, on the contrary, more subdued,† and if that be the case, it will be a convincing proof that the warlike demonstration of last April was a mere abortive attempt to bully us out of our rights.

The portion of the President's Message which alludes to France, having been the subject of various comments, I transcribe it entire underneath, as I mean to introduce some of those comments as well as my own remarks thereon:

"Even France—the country which had been our ancient ally—the country which has a common interest with us in maintaining the freedom of the seas—the country which, by the session of Louisiana, first opened to us access to the Gulf of Mexico—the country with which we have been every year drawing more closely the bonds of successful commerce—most unexpectedly, and to our unfeigned regret, took part in an effort to prevent annexation, and to impose on Texas, as a condition of the recognition of her independence by Mexico, that she would never join herself to the United States. We may rejoice that the tranquil and pervading influence of the American principle of self-government was suffi-

* The next number of this series of articles will contain a translation thereof.

† Unless, peradventure, the emergency I have alluded to in the last article, (that of the British getting possession of California,) was to prove correct.

cient to defeat the purposes of British and French interference, and that the almost unanimous voice of the people of Texas has given to that interference a peaceful and effective rebuke. From this example, European governments may learn how vain diplomatic arts and intrigues must ever prove upon this continent, against that system of self-government which seems natural to our soil, and which will ever resist foreign interference."

General Cass, in a late speech in the Senate, observed with truth, that the above intimation is a well-deserved rebuke to the French Government for their intrigues in Texas and in Mexico; thereupon, the French organ of M. Guizot, in this city, came out with foul abuse on the General; calls him a flatterer and a sycophant; because, forsooth, the Senator from Michigan, when in France, wrote a book praising Louis Philippe! It is true that General Cass wrote such a book, but what does that prove? It proves that the General, like many other eminent men, has been for some time hood-winked by the wiles and duplicity of the *citizen King*; the noble and patriotic Lafayette *praised* also Louis Philippe; he died shortly afterwards, and his memoirs, published by his family, exhibit in words of truth, how the candid and venerable patriot was jilted by the trickish son of Philippe Egalite—how his heart was ulcerated, and how his last hours were embittered by the sad conviction that he had, unsuspectingly, delivered over the destinies of his beloved country into the hands of a heartless hypocrite and a rapacious despot.

The liberal and open-hearted Lafitte not only praised Louis Philippe, but actually *made him a King*. Well, a few years afterwards, the undeceived and *repentant* Lafitte, from the tribune of the Chamber of Deputies, publicly, before the whole world, *asked forgiveness* "to God and man to have been the means of placing Louis Philippe on the throne of France." No doubt that General Cass repents, likewise, to have deceived his countrymen as to the true character of Louis Philippe; great many of them labor, as yet, under the delusion he has created, and it is his duty to act like Lafitte, and to make a public recantation.

The French organ I have before alluded to, descants as follows on that portion of the Message which alludes to France:

"The French Government will be deeply wounded by the accusation of treason (treachery) and *intrigue*, (the word is there at full length,) openly cast upon it from the Presidential Chair. And, let us say it, the French Cabinet will not be wounded without reason. Whether the policy it adopted on the Texan question were good or bad, it owes no account of it other than to its own country and its own conscience, and it belongs not to any foreign Government to constitute itself the Judge thereof. The accusation preferred by Mr. Polk against the policy of M. Guizot will so much the more irritate the latter, as it will be in the hands of the opposition in France a sharp weapon, the *left* of the Chamber will scourge unmercifully with the policy of the Ministry. But M. Guizot is not a patient victim, and when he turns upon his adversaries, his *return blow usually brings one or more of them to the ground*. We are much deceived, or Mr. Polk will have his share in these vigorous reprisals."

According to the doctrine thus laid down by the French editor, it matters not what low intrigues the French Government may have been

guilty of, to the injury of the United States. "It belongs not," says he, "to any foreign government to constitute itself the judge thereof;" and accordingly Mr. Polk, for having done so, is threatened with "vigorous reprisals" from M. Guizot.

The French paper tells us that "the return blow of M. Guizot leaves one or more of his adversaries *on the ground*"—this sentence will not be generally understood: it requires explanation: nearly half of the whole number of the deputies of France are *salaried functionaries*, and the half of the remainder are striving to get situations for themselves or their relatives; so, when it is said that M. Guizot leaves his adversaries *on the ground*, it means that he takes from them the pap they receive from the Treasury,* and leaves them, *on the ground*, to shift for themselves.

The above strange reasoning of M. Guizot's organ, has thus been commented upon by the *Morning News*: "It is very possible that Sir Robert Peel may feel a little annoyed, and Monsieur Guizot deeply wounded, when, to the mortification of the failure—the unmitigated and humiliating failure—of all those abortive labors of monarchical diplomacy, is added the unpleasant necessity of hearing them thus *coolly rebuked*." And further: "The President has used a moderation of expression due much more to our own self-respect than to M. Guizot's deserts; and if the term "intrigue" had been directly applied to his course, (which has not been done,) and with it that of "duplicity" added to boot, the French Premier, might, perhaps, have indeed reddened with anger; but full half of the blush would have been due to conscious shame and *detected disgrace*."

The French paper, however, has not been left alone to sustain the cause of M. Guizot; the *Courier and Enquirer* has the following remark: "It was indecorous to read a lecture to the French Government." And further: "It was impolitic, at a moment when it was important not to lose French sympathies."

Now, if the Whig paper just now quoted be in earnest in the above remark, it laboured under a great mistake; the French *Government* and the French *People* are two very different things, and the event will prove it. I venture to assert that the *sympathies of the French People* will be more and more in our favour, in proportion as we detect and rebuke openly the crooked policy of M. Guizot, and his notorious subserviency to British interests. Louis Philippe and his ministry hate heartily our Democratic Institutions: they use all the means in their power to undermine them; the *Journal de Debats*, and all the papers under their influence, are daily traducing the American character, and vilifying our form of government. The most proper way to retaliate, is to let them understand that we are aware of their views and of their trickery. They dare not show their anger; Louis Philippe is fully aware that a war with the United States, he acting therein as the vassal of England, would seal his fate, as a sovereign. Let the press of this country

* The threat of instant removal from office held, like the sword of Damocles, over the French Deputies, is the principal cause of the support which is given to the most unpopular Minister that France ever had; the French Ministerial papers, in the attempt to humbug the public, attribute that support to his eloquence; if Louis Philippe was to withdraw his countenance from his Minister, the eloquence of M. Guizot would not avail him twenty-four hours.

retaliate vigorously to the recriminations of the French ministerial organs, and they will soon lower their tone.

On the whole, I sum up the argument as follows: The rebuke of Mr. Polk will have a salutary influence in France, and the effect of the Message will be, to increase in our favour the *sympathies of the French People*.

No. VII.

NEW YORK, December 31st, 1845.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

To the Editor of the *Globe*:

I began to prepare some comments on the following translation, where-to allusion is made in my last communication, but the Parisian article itself is rather lengthy, and, with the addition of those comments, it would encroach too much on your columns. Those comments, as well as the further investigation of the probable effect in Europe of the President's Message, will be the subject of another number.

PARIS, April 9th, 1845.

Threats of the British Aristocracy on the Subject of Oregon.

The inaugural speech of President Polk has produced an explosion of high wrought up feelings in the British Parliament: the sullen and concentrated anger which I alluded to a few days ago,* has at last exploded—the Ministers, and several of the leading members of both shades of the Aristocracy, have matured their parts, and after six days of preparation have enacted a *grand theatrical denunciation*.

President Polk has taken the liberty, in addressing the American people, to say that, in *his opinion*, the title of the United States on the Oregon Territory was "clear and unquestionable," and that he would maintain it by all constitutional means, with this restriction, "that every obligation imposed by treaty or conventional stipulation should be sacredly respected."

The British Ministry pretend, on their side, that the rights of Great Britain on the same territory are "clear and unquestionable," and that "they are ready to maintain them *at all hazards*."

In contrasting thus the *identical terms* of the two declarations, there is no difficulty to perceive on which side is the blustering.

If the British Ministers are convinced that the claims of England are "unquestionable," no one can object at their saying so; but there is no need of swaggering on the subject of a question wherein the opinion of the President can have no hostile effect for a considerable space of time. What can, then, be the reason of the concerted understanding of the organs of the two shades of the Aristocracy in threatening the United States? To burn down their towns—to stir up a war of revolted slaves—to supply the Mexicans with ships and sailors, to enable them thereby to fit out privateers against American commerce?

* On the 2d of April I published an article in a Parisian daily paper, with comments on the Inaugural of Mr. Polk, remarking, that it had been received in England with *sullen anger*, &c.

The language of the President on the subject of Oregon is not of that pressing importance that will warrant such a sudden and violent denunciation. There are several causes that the Aristocracy does not wish to divulge, which has provoked it—they are the following: The ascendancy that the Democratic party has regained in the United States; the firm and resolute tone wherewith the President has identified himself with the views and the principles of that party; the mortification felt by the British Ministers, in finding that the intrigues of their agents, in Texas and in Mexico, have been detected and derided at. Finally, the vote of the last Congress for the annexation of Texas, which, confidently, they did not expect to take place. Those are the true causes of the irritation and of the threats of the British Aristocracy; the obvious aim of the British Ministers in getting up with so much *eclat* a warlike demonstration in Parliament, is to insulate the new President. The English Aristocracy accuse Mr. Polk, to court popular passions; and it is them, on the contrary, who, in the most solemn manner, exert all their influence to excite the feelings of the powerful British interests which exist in the United States—for the purpose of denouncing the opinion of the President as tantamount to a declaration of war; and, in order to prove to the American people that Parliament are unanimous to sustain the Ministry and the Press in their denunciation, and in the threats that escort it, they have delayed one day, for that express intent, the departure of the mail steamer for Boston. But the Americans know that the support of Parliament has never failed to the Aristocracy, in all its aggressive wars. Lord North had for him Parliament and the Press, to wage war in America in 1776. What has been the result?

I have, I trust, conclusively demonstrated in former communications that England, notwithstanding her immense means of aggression, is in a most precarious situation to wage a protracted maritime war. Pretexts are not wanted to pick up a quarrel with the United States—she might easily find some, if it suited her—it is the apprehension of the consequences that makes her hold back; and I assert, in direct opposition to the language of the British Ministry, that it will not go to war unless it expects intestine division in the United States.

It is to be hoped that President Polk will not be intimidated by the warlike demonstration of the British Aristocracy, and that he will evince the sincerity of his opinion, as to the claims of the United States on the Oregon Territory, by refusing to negotiate on any other basis than what are *deducible* from the terms of his Inaugural Speech.

The course which Congress ought to follow is clear enough. It is indicated in the resolutions which have been passed in the House of Representatives, but not acted upon by the Senate. The next Congress, will, no doubt, pass resolutions of the same intent, and the effect thereof will be, to place the United States in Oregon on the same footing that England has been for some twenty years; beyond those measures of self-protection, no aggressive steps will be taken by the United States; it will be left to England, if she wants to prevent the *accretive* power of the American settlers, to declare war; and that is the very thing she will not do, unless she finds that the councils of the United States are distracted. All the extensive means under the control of British interests will be set in motion to create division; but the masses are intelli-

gent in the United States; they know how to appreciate properly the honest motives of men who hold the helm of State; and if, as it is to be expected, Mr. Polk does his duty, popular support will give him a preponderancy to put down party spirit, and to sustain the national character and the dignity of the country. The President is the direct representative of the whole people *taken individually*. This peculiar feature of the American Constitution accounts for a fact that many people wonder at without perceiving the cause thereof; the fact alluded to is this—THE HONEST OPINION AND THE MERE RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT ON ALL QUESTIONS OF A NATIONAL CHARACTER, IS MORE POWERFUL IN AMERICA THAN WOULD BE IN EUROPE THE ROYAL WILL OF THE MOST ABSOLUTE SOVEREIGN, *and even Congress must abide by it.*

REMARK.—The underneath article was intended, like the preceding numbers, to appear in the *Daily Globe*, and accordingly the manuscript thereof was left in the hands of the person who took charge of the others; on finding that five or six days had elapsed without its being inserted, I withdrew it on the 14th of January, for the purpose of publishing the whole in pamphlet form.

NO. VIII.

NEW YORK, January 7th, 1846.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

The translation from the French of "Threats of the British Aristocracy on the subject of Oregon," which was the theme of the last number, sets in juxta position the *identical* words of the declaration *made by both* Mr. Polk and the British Ministry on the Oregon question, and the following inference therein drawn must be granted as correct by any person who will compare the two declarations, namely: "In contrasting thus the *identical* terms of the two declarations, there is no difficulty to perceive on which side is the *blustering*."

The principal aim of the British Government, in the blustering alluded to, was to insulate the President, and to weaken thereby the American Administration, so as to prevent the accomplishing act of Texas annexation. The following article of the Ministerial paper, the *London Standard*, betrays thus, in an unguarded moment,* the secret motive of the British Ministers: "London, May 2d. The feverish anxiety which has prevailed for these two or three weeks had not decreased, as the late news by the packet Waterloo (from New York, April 11) gives out, that

* The *Standard* of the 28th of March (the day that Mr. Polk's Inaugural was published in London) has the following comment on the passage of the resolutions for the annexation of Texas: "All this is interesting, and that is all; for truly, it does not concern us any more than the acts and the gestures from the Celestial empire." Let the reader contrast this dissembled resignation with the anxiety betrayed by the same paper, in the article above transcribed of the 2nd of May, and it will give him an adequate idea of the sincerity, and of the consistency, of the organs of British Aristocracy.

nothing is to be expected from the *Justice* of the administration at Washington, and, it is believed, that nothing but the attitude taken by England and France on the subject of Texas can prevent the American Government from *accomplishing annexation*. We look out, therefore, with impatience to know *what effect the demonstration made by both Houses of Parliament* (on the 4th of April) may have produced in the United States." It becomes evident from the above avowal that much, to prevent the last act of annexation, was expected from the warlike demonstration of Parliament, &c. Well, the Caledonia arrived on the 14th of May, bringing out the expected news; it turned out that the threats from England had not the anticipated effect, and the agent of the *Times* in this country (a Genevese Traveller)* and that of the *Morning Chronicle* (Publicus) agreed in advising the British Government to give up, for the present, the bullying system—that it would not do, *that Mr. Polk would be sustained*, &c.; the consequence was, that the organs of the aristocracy, although awfully disappointed, declared sullenly, that they were *well satisfied* with the news.

The purport of the above disquisition is to enable the reader to form, at once, a correct view of the reasoning I am going to set forth as to the probable effect of the President's Message in England, and I proceed, now, to quote those parts thereof that bear upon the Oregon question.

The President states as follows: "Though entertaining the settled conviction, that the British pretensions of title could not be maintained to any portion of the Oregon territory, upon any principle of public law recognised by nations, yet, in deference to what had been done by my predecessors, and especially in consideration that propositions of compromise had been thrice made by two preceding administrations, to adjust the question on the parallel of forty-nine degrees, and in two of them yielding to Great Britain the free navigation of the Columbia, and that the pending negotiation had been commenced on the basis of compromise, I deemed it to be my duty not absolutely to break it off. In consideration, too, that under the conventions of 1818 and 1827, the citizens and subjects of the two powers held a joint occupancy of the country, and was induced to make another effort to settle their long pending controversy in the spirit of moderation which had given birth to the renewed discussion. A proposition was accordingly made, which was rejected.

* The letters in the *Times*, subscribed "A Genevese Traveller," are edited by a person in this city named D****, as it appears from the following anecdote recited by Lord Ashburton in jocular conversation; here is the substance of the great banker's *bon-mot*: "A few days after my arrival in New York I wrote a note to Mr. D., stating that I should be happy to see him at my apartments at the Astor House; he accordingly called on me, and when we were closeted together I told him—'well Mr. D. we value your letters very highly in England, as the information they convey to us is very useful, and if I can render you any service, I will be very happy to do it; your style is remarkably clear and *forcible*, and there was a passage in one of your letters which struck us as being peculiarly *significant*. You said: 'If the *proper man* be sent over, there is no difficulty to arrange the Northeastern Boundary. You had, no doubt, something important and particularly in view for using the qualifying adjective of *proper*?' Mr. D. answered me he had not; he meant, that a personage like me, by *ir*ance, he considered a *proper man*." His lordship was of course too discreet to mention whether any services were rendered. This anecdote shows that Lord Ashburton liked, occasionally, to crack a joke. In note 4, of article No. 3, I have taken the same view of the subject as had been expressed by "a Genevese Traveller"—the GREAT BANKER WAS, indeed, the *proper man*.

by the British plenipotentiary, who, without submitting any other proposition, suffered the negotiation on his part to drop, expressing his trust that the United States would offer what he saw fit to call 'some farther proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question, *more consistent with fairness and equity*, and with the reasonable expectation of the British Government.' The proposition thus offered and rejected, repeated the offer of the parallel of forty-nine degrees of north latitude, which had been made by two preceding administrations, but without proposing to surrender to Great Britain, as they had done, the free navigation of the Columbia river." Further, the President states: "Had this been a new question, coming under discussion for the first time, *this proposition would not have been made*. The extraordinary and wholly inadmissible demands of the British Government, and the rejection of the proposition made in deference alone to what had been done by my predecessors, and the implied obligations which their acts seemed to impose, afford satisfactory evidence that no *compromise that the United States ought to accept can be effected*. With this conviction, the proposition which had been made and rejected, was, by my direction, subsequently withdrawn, and our title to the *whole Oregon Territory* asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable facts and arguments."

The passages in italics in the above paragraph set forth that Mr. Polk has no expectation that any "compromise that the United States ought to accept can be effected;" and, then, that "our title to the *whole Oregon Territory* is asserted, and, as is believed, maintained by irrefragable facts," &c. The above official declaration, it cannot be denied, is much stronger than that of the Inaugural, which expressed merely an *opinion*. I refer on this point to the assertion I made in No. 6 of this series,* and I make bold to assert, besides, (in case the emergency I have alluded to in No. 6 does not happen,) that we will not hear this time that the mail steamer has been delayed for the purpose of threatening us, as in April last, with the whole budget of a general denunciation.

The following passages of the Message lay down principles on international law, which will be galling to the British Aristocracy, to wit— "The United States, sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good understanding with all nations, cannot in silence *permit any European interference* on the North American continent; and should any be attempted, will be ready to *resist it at all hazards*." And—

"Existing rights of every European nation should be respected; but it is due alike to our safety and our interests, that the efficient protection of our laws should be extended over our whole territorial limits, and that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy, *that no future European colony or dominion, shall, with our consent, be planted or established on any part of the North American continent.*"

On the whole, it may be said that no Message issued from the Presidential chair has ever asserted rights and doctrines so offensive to the views of the statesmen of England, as the one I am reviewing; and yet, I assert in advance, that no ministerial ebullition will take place. This assertion will seem at first as being an anomaly; but those persons who have read my preceding numbers will appreciate the correctness of the following reasoning, *why such an offensive message will, nevertheless, have a peaceful tendency in England*. The popular enthusiasm that the Message has produced in

* See the third paragraph thereof.

the United States will be known or foreseen in England at about the time it will be received there, and the British ministers, on ascertaining that the great mass of the American people are ready to sustain the President, will give up bullying; they never meant to go to war for Oregon, and their secret resolve on the subject will become thus *apparent* to the whole world; they know that they can hold their own in Oregon for many years to come, and they will trust the result to procrastination, bribery, and the intrigues of all kinds which they understand so well how to manage.

I remarked in No. 6 of this series that the Message had silenced the opponents of the President *for a while*; but they have been covertly at work; their movements begin to be perceptible—many of the letter writers and several of the presses, which were foremost for the whole of Oregon, have fallen back rather abruptly on 49 degrees, and will fall lower still whenever it suits the secret influence which is acting upon them; the Whig presses in the Atlantic cities, and the British organs in general, has lately teemed with articles and rumors whose burthen is to prepare the public mind for *concession*; delay, is now the watch-word among the initiated, and, yesterday, the Editor of the *Courier and Inquirer*, who is generally so very ferocious against his opponents in politics, comes down on his knees to implore “men of all parties to use their influence, at least to delay the adoption by either house of Congress of any proposition now before it—either for giving the twelve months notice to Great Britain, or for extending the jurisdiction of our laws over our citizens in Oregon, or for increasing our military force with a view to occupying posts on the route, to and within, that territory.” The *Courier* who swagged so much lately about military preparations, is now even opposed to increase “our military force with a view to occupying posts on the route to Oregon” for fear it might give offence to Great Britain. At Washington, various insidious means and measures are contrived, also, to delay, and prevent, if possible, the action of Congress on the express recommendations of the President; and a debate has lately taken place in the Senate, whereof a brief synopsis will throw some light on the tactics of those who, directly or indirectly, act under the influence of British interests.

On the 30th of December, the resolutions of Mr. Hannegan came up; they were read, and on motion of Mr. Archer, seconded by the mover, the consideration thereof was postponed; but Mr. Calhoun, it seems, thought that this was a fit opportunity “to define his position:” after a short preamble, he introduced a set of resolutions, and made a speech which does not bespeak much for his frankness, for he appeared to be very studious to defend the course of the President on the Oregon question against the implied censure of Mr. Hannegan; while, on the other hand, he declares he is opposed to giving the year’s notice to England, which the President expressly recommends in the following explicit language:

“*All attempts at compromise having failed*, it becomes the duty of Congress to consider what measures it may be proper to adopt for the security and protection of our citizens now inhabiting, or who may hereafter inhabit Oregon, and for the maintenance of our just title to that territory. In adopting measures for this purpose, care should be taken that nothing be done to violate the stipulations of the convention of 1827,

which is still in force. Under that convention, a year's notice is required to be given by either party to the other, before the joint occupancy shall terminate, and before either can rightfully assert or exercise exclusive jurisdiction over any portion of the territory. *This notice, it would in my judgment, be proper to give; and I recommend that provision be made by law for giving it accordingly, and terminating in this manner the convention of the 6th of August, 1827.*"

The above recommendation is earnest, and without ambiguity; it proves that the Senator from South Carolina, under cover of defending the course of the President, takes strong ground in opposing his most important measures. The *sectional* feeling of Mr. Calhoun has so far biassed his judgment as to blind him in adopting a course which cannot have any beneficial, or even a practical, result to settle the Oregon question. If Mr. Calhoun had positive assurance that the British Government would take up the terms of the compromise proposed by Mr. Polk last summer, there might be some excuse for his course; but I venture to assert, and *time will prove it*, that Mr. Calhoun has no guaranty *whatsoever* to that effect: Great Britain will not *take up* the aforesaid proposition, and anything less, Mr. Calhoun ought to know, will not be ratified by *two-thirds* of the Senators.

No hesitation whatever ought to be felt for giving Great Britain the one year's notice; let *that notice* pass by nearly an unanimous vote, and what I have already stated will become *apparent* to all, namely: that the British ministers "never meant to go to war for Oregon"—that is, so long as their stake and risk, in a *protracted* maritime war, will be as great and eminent as they are now.

It is a great mistake to suppose that procrastination would be advantageous to the United States; the very reverse would be the case. Procrastination, at the time when the necessity for proper action has been so clearly and forcibly indicated by the President, would be an undeniable proof that apprehension of the *displeasure* of England would be the real cause thereof; it would prove conclusively that Congress dare not pass resolutions akin to those which last year went through the House of Representatives by a great majority; and the admiration and respect, which the high and becoming tone assumed by the President in his message has, no doubt, produced in Europe, would be superceded by contempt and ridicule. The immediate effect of delaying the one year's notice would be, therefore, to induce the British Government to assume a hostile attitude, which would prolong indefinitely a state of uncertainty as to the final result—nearly as bad as war itself. Moreover, when it would be understood in the western states that Congress *backs out*, the tide of emigration would cease to set towards Oregon.

The House of Representatives, notwithstanding all the intrigues that are at work, will, no doubt, pass the Oregon resolutions. Mr. Calhoun in his speech said, that he would hold *responsible* those who might, (according to his view,) be the cause of war. I will tell him, that the American people will hold him *responsible*, should the one year's notice be rejected in the Senate, *through his influence*.

The next number will contain an argumentative summary of the inferences and conclusions to be drawn and deduced from this long series of articles on the question, "Will there be War?"

No. IX.

NEW YORK, January 14, 1846.

Will there be War between the United States and Great Britain?

By comparing carefully the various circumstances, which, more or less, may have had an influence on past events; by observing with discrimination the various phasis of political, commercial, and financial movements; and, finally, by recording faithfully the opinions formed conformably to the above rules, so as to test the soundness of one's judgment, a calm and impartial observer may be enabled, thereby, to indicate correctly, *beforehand*, the solution of the pending events which engross public attention.

The query, "Will there be War?" is now the topic of all conversations. The general answer is, there will be no war; but there are very few persons that can give *satisfactory* reasons to others, or even to themselves, for their opinions on the subject. Some will tell you there will be no war, because of the kindred ties of the two nations speaking the same language; others, because England wants our bread-stuffs; some, because she cannot do without our cotton; others, because christianity, and the high state of civilization of the two countries, forbid it; many, in the Atlantic cities, assert loudly that the United States *must and will back out*, as they verily believe that England is clearly right. Those reasons fail invariably to carry conviction, even into the minds of those who set them forth: the apprehension of war still remains, and the same persons day after day propound over again the same query, hoping, no doubt, that some one will be able to give them better reasons than they can find out themselves. Let such persons read with attention, "The Analysis of the *Elements* which constitute the power of England," (see pages 11 to 14;) it has been penned conformably to the precepts laid down in the first paragraph of this article; it is, in fact, the result of a close observation on the political, financial, and commercial events of the last forty years. Let those persons ponder well on the irresistible tendency of the *historical facts* grouped and recorded in that analysis, and on the logical inferences which obviously must be drawn therefrom, and they will *feel convinced* that the British Aristocracy cannot, without incurring the most eminent peril, run the risk of a protracted war with this country; and those persons will then be able to explain satisfactorily to their friends the *real potent cause* that prevents England, notwithstanding her immense means of aggression, from going to war.

On the strength of the views clearly deducible from the analysis above alluded to, I published in Paris, in 1845, a series of articles, wherein I indicated in clear and explicit language, *the course of events* as to the

* Those articles appeared chiefly in a daily paper called *La Reforme*, and the spirit of some of them found their way in the *Siecle*, the *National*, the *Commerce*, &c., whose editors had my manuscripts on hand for a length of time; they were republished in the form of a *brochure* in the month of March. Subsequently other articles were published, which were also republished in a *brochure*, in the month of May.

international difficulties then pending, and all the conclusions therein drawn, as to the final consummation of those events, have been verified with an unerring precision. I asserted, in positive terms, in those articles, that "England would not go to war to prevent the annexation of Texas;" and, moreover, that said annexation would take place "regardless of her threats and of her intrigues." The same facts, and the same reasoning, that led me to set forth the above assertions, act in full force as to the stand taken by great Britain on the subject of Oregon. She will recede, in proportion as we will assert with unanimity our unquestionable rights. As to the remarkable correctness of all the conclusions above adverted to, I refer to a couple of pamphlets published in Paris in March and May last.*

Well, now that I have in this and the preceding numbers connected the chain of uncontrovertible facts first established, with such official declarations, axiomatic principles, and ungarbled quotations as have an important bearing to illustrate my views on the question, "WILL THERE BE WAR?" I will proceed to give a summary of the principal inferences and conclusions which are evidently corollary therefrom—they are the following:

1st. That the British Aristocracy will take good care not to engage in a war with the United States on the subject of Oregon, unless they have positive assurances that it would lead, at once, to a disruption of the confederacy.

2nd. That the giving the year's notice, and the passing by Congress of such measures, to protect our citizens in Oregon, as do not infringe on treaty stipulations, will have the effect, if it be done promptly, to remove all apprehensions of war, as it will then become *apparent* to all, that England will keep quiet on the subject of Oregon.

3rd. That hesitation and backwardness, in either branch of Congress, to share with the President the responsibility of the acts he has recommended on the subject of Oregon, would have the tendency of inducing the British Government to hold back, and apprehensions of war would increase, or diminish, in proportion as our councils might appear to be more or less divided.

4th. That the people of the United States will sustain the President in the stand he has taken in his Message, regardless of the intrigues which may succeed, *temporarily*, to prevent the passage of the Oregon resolutions in the Senate.

5th. That the President, sustained by the popular support of the masses, will ultimately succeed to carry his measures through in Congress, UNLESS HE LACK DECISION—UNLESS HE FALTER IN HIS DUTY.

The Proper Course to Secure, peaceably, the Whole of the Oregon Territory.

The following measures will ensure to us, in course of time, the whole of Oregon:

1st. The one year's notice should be given promptly and unanimously.

* A few copies which remain on hand, will be left for sale at William Taylor's, No. 2 Astor House.

2nd. All the protection, which is compatible with existing stipulations, should be, at once, by law, extended to the settlers, and encouragement should forthwith be given to emigration to Oregon, by grants of land, &c., within our actual occupancy.

3rd. At the end of the year's notice, the jurisdiction of the United States ought to be asserted, by law, *to the line of compromise offered by the President* last summer.

4th. And, in order to demonstrate that the nation's resolve is made up in taking a resolute stand in support of those three measures, the principal harbours should immediately be put under a proper state of defence, and the United States steam navy materially increased.

Let the above measures be deliberately sustained, each at the time specified, by a great majority of Congress, and the power of *accretion* will give us *the whole of Oregon* before the expiration of ten to fifteen years.

The propriety of the two first measures, and their *peaceful tendency*, has been demonstrated in the preceding pages; the intent of the fourth measure would be to give a convincing and *significant* proof of our *unanimity*. The act of submitting thus to *precautionary* expenditure, *in time of peace*, would be considered, *in the right quarter*, as a sure indication that we would not shrink from any sacrifice to vindicate our just rights: it would have, decidedly, a peaceful tendency. The propriety of the third measure requires a short explication. The President in his Message has the following paragraph:

"At the end of the year's notice, should Congress think it proper to make provision for giving that notice, we shall have reached a period when the national rights in Oregon must either be abandoned or be firmly maintained. That they cannot be abandoned, without a sacrifice of both national honor and interest, is too clear to admit of doubt."

Considering that the compromise offered by Mr. Polk has been rejected rather contemptuously by the British plenipotentiary, it was not improper that the President should state the alternative as above recited; but the same reasons which prompted Mr. Polk to offer the line of 49 degrees, will exist in their full force at the end of the year's notice. Congress ought to act accordingly, and no doubt would *do it*—if the other conjoint measures were to be adopted by a great majority. It would show to the world that our stand had been duly considered as regards justice, and that *we are still willing to concede*, as a forfeit, for our neglect in not asserting sooner our *indisputable* claim, the same terms which were offered by the President in 1845. This concession being connected with the other decisive measures above recommended, would, on the other hand, unequivocally demonstrate, that we would not swerve from resolutions so deliberately and solemnly taken.

The British subjects now settled in Oregon have, through our long and careless forbearance, acquired rights which, in equity, ought to be respected, and English jurisdiction north of 49 degrees ought to be allowed as long as the British residents would think it expedient. But any one who will take into due consideration the *efficiency* of the measures, above set forth, for promoting a large and increasing emigration, will, no doubt, conclude that the quiet, but absorbing power of accretion, would unite the whole of Oregon under the American flag within ten to fifteen years, at most.

Some people will object to the views herein expressed, under the ap-

prehension that border disputes would take place, and that war would be the consequence. This might be very true if the British Aristocracy were disposed to run the risk thereof. I have, I trust, conclusively established in the preceding pages that the great stake *they* would have in jeopardy, by going to war against an united people, would prevent it; there is no danger whatsoever that the decisive, but, at the same time, *conciliatory*, measures above recommended would be the cause of hostilities. Border disputes in Oregon would have less effect to provoke war, than the border disputes which, occasionally, used to take place on the Northeastern boundary.

The offer made by the President last summer, for settling the Oregon dispute, was eminently judicious; it has conceded much for the sake of compromise, at the same time that it has reserved what constitutes the *principal importance of Oregon in a commercial point of view*, namely: the outlets in the Pacific, and the *exclusive controul of the Columbia river*.* No compromise can take place as to the *right* of the exclusive navigation of said river; but I do not see any inconvenience to allow merchant vessels to navigate it, in pursuance of *free trade principles*.

A proposition has been lately started in many quarters, that we should give up to the British the *right* of navigation on the Columbia river, provided they should grant us an equivalent—the *right* of navigation on the St. Lawrence. The *right* of navigating a river, whereof both sides are occupied and fortified by a foreign nation, is liable to numberless disputes and difficulties; we have an instance, at the present time, as to *our right* to navigate the St. John, which is stipulated by treaty, but it is well known that the British authorities render that *right* nugatory.

On the whole, I am fully satisfied that the adoption by Congress of the four measures, as set forth at the head of this article, *conjointly, in all its parts and spirit*, WOULD SECURE TO US, PEACEABLY, THE WHOLE OF OREGON.

NEW YORK, January 31st, 1846.

REMARK.—On Wednesday, the 15th instant, the *matter* to make up this pamphlet was left in the hands of the printer, with the expectation that it would be published in the course of a few days; but, owing to some unavoidable circumstances, the printing thereof has been delayed to this day. I avail myself of that delay to write and insert an additional article, on the subject of the late news brought by the steamer Hibernia, from Liverpool.

Resignation of the Peel Ministry, and their Return into Power.

Twelve or thirteen days ago the packet ship Liberty brought over the news of the resignation of the British Ministry, and the appointment of Lord John Russell to form a Whig administration; on the 24th instant, within a week's time, the Steamer Hibernia furnished us with the infor-

* The line of forty-nine degrees would give us Pujet's Sound, the Straits of Fuca, part of Vancouver's Island, and an important port at the entrance of the Straits.

mation that Lord John Russell has failed to form an administration, and that Sir Robert Peel, with his colleagues, have resumed their offices. The whole of this manœuvring strikes me as being a mere juggle, which has been enacted for the purpose of turning away the public attention from the new policy which the British Aristocracy means to pursue; and the reader will do well, preparatory to reading what follows, to look over a note appended to pages 13 and 14 of this pamphlet, wherein the devices of the British Aristocracy are strikingly illustrated. I transcribe therefrom the following remark: "The pretended division of the British Aristocracy in two parties, denominated the Whig and the Tory party, is a mere gull-trap to deceive the people into the belief that there are some patriots among them. It has the advantage, besides, whenever they find *that a change of measures become necessary*, to enable them to do so with *good grace*, by letting the whigs or the tories, as the case may be, to take the administration of affairs in opposition to their mock opponents." The sentences in italics give the explanation of the late manœuvres—a *change of measures* has become necessary. The British ministry, through vexation and sullen anger at the passage by Congress of the resolutions annexing Texas, took a stand on the subject of Oregon which, I have recorded in pages 30 to 31 of this pamphlet; this stand has been met by the President in his late Message. The breaking up of the negotiations last summer, and particularly the tone of the last note from Mr. Buchanan to the British plenipotentiary, wherein the American Secretary of State claims, *officially*, the whole of Oregon, must have convinced the British ministry that the President would toe the mark in his forthcoming Message. Some means must be contrived to recede, *with good grace*, from the threatening attitude assumed last April; hence the manœuvring about the resignation, the attempt to form a new administration, and, finally, the return of the old one. While the public mind was thus agitated by those *mighty* changes, the leading organs of the Aristocracy assumed a more friendly tone towards America; in the meantime, the President's Message arrives in England, and, although it asserts, *officially*, claims that had been so violently denounced when the President, in his Inaugural, set forth those claims as being, in his opinion, "unquestionable," we find that the Message has had a *peaceful tendency*.

No. 6 of this pamphlet was published in the *Daily Globe* of the 30th of December last, and the reader, by perusing it, will find (see page 27) that I distinctly indicated the above result as to the *peaceful effect* of the Message, my assertions thereon being predicated on the very reasons which, no doubt, have brought it about.

The burden of the news brought by the *Hibernia*, concerning the various phasis of the ministerial movements, may be condensed in a few lines. Sir Robert Peel, meeting with opposition from the Duke of Wellington on the subject of the corn laws, which *he is represented as* being bent upon repealing altogether, resigns with all his colleagues. Lord Russell is sent for—accepts the charge of forming a new administration, but fails to do it on account, *it is said*, that Earl Grey objects to Lord Palmerston. Whereupon, Sir Robert Peel with his colleagues resume at once their offices, without further ceremony. While this manœuvring was performed, which took up about a fortnight, the automaton Queen was all the time *graciously pleased*—*graciously pleased*, to accept Sir Robert Peel's resignation—*graciously pleased*, to take up Lord Russell

and her former whig friends—and, lastly, graciously pleased, to greet again Sir Robert Peel as her prime minister.

Let us look, although slightly, *en passant*, under the surface of things, as they are above *represented*, and enquire, somewhat, into their correctness.

If the opposition of the Duke of Wellington to the repeal of the corn laws had been the *true cause* of the breaking up of the ministry, how is it that Sir Robert Peel consented to resume his office *with the Duke of Wellington as his colleague*? If the intention of Sir Robert Peel had been to form a new administration, having within itself the proper elements of strength, is it reasonable to suppose that he would have recommended Lord Russell for that purpose? It is notorious, that the said Lord is pledged to introduce measures that have no chance whatever to obtain a majority in Parliament—a Russell administration is, at the present time, unpracticable. And as to the reason set forth, that Lord Russell failed to form an administration because Earl Grey objected to Lord Palmerston, it must, on reflection, strike the reader as being rather shallow.

The above remarks, although made hastily, point out significantly some of the inconsistencies of the statements of the British press, to hoodwink, not only the English people, but the world at large. It is not necessary for my actual purpose to go deeper into the subject; I wish merely to record my deliberate opinion thereon, namely—that the whole transaction, as I stated at the outset, *has been a mere juggle*, and I am inclined to believe, besides, that there has been a secret understanding, throughout the whole *imbroglio*, between Sir Robert Peel and Lord Russell.

The effect produced by the late news, on the tone of a majority of the newspapers in the Atlantic cities, deserves a passing remark. Before the arrival of the news, most of the editors thereof affected to express their belief that war was not possible, &c.; but that opinion was evidently predicated on the hope they entertained that Congress would not support the measures recommended by the President; apprehensions of war were still rankling into the minds of most of them, as it may have been easily remarked by their harping day after day on the same subject, and, moreover, by the joy they have manifested at the *pacific complexion* of the news, which, it appears obvious, has taken them by surprise; and they seem to think, because England has not issued forth those warlike declarations *they so much apprehended*, that all the difficulties will be settled at once. This is falling from one mistake into another: I foresaw distinctly the *pacific reception* of the Message, which, by not expecting it, has surprised them so agreeably; but I am far from thinking that the difficulties will be arranged so very quickly, especially if the advice of those editors was to be followed. The British ministry have been preparing for a *change of measures*; but the *new policy* they are adopting may be more dangerous than that of intimidation, which they have had to give up.—We must not forget the Ashburton treaty—coaxing, delay, bribery, intrigues, have often had more effect than cannon. The character of the press in the Atlantic cities is not calculated to keep us on the alert as to the danger of this *new policy*. The majority of the editors thereof may be divided into four classes: 1st—Those who are positively under British influence. 2nd—Those who care nothing for honour or country when the loss of a dollar is at stake. 3rd—Those who are connected with

British commercial and financial interests. 4th—Those who are so much dazzled by the immense aggressive power of Great Britain, as not to perceive her *weak points*. To the two first classes I have nothing to say—all arguments are useless; but to those of the third and fourth class, and to that part of the community which may be under the influence of the same views, I will submit a few remarks for their consideration. It has been generally asserted that England does not recede, and that it was wrong for Mr. Polk to join issue with her on the subject of Oregon, as war must be the inevitable consequence. This observation was made by the editors of the third and fourth, as well as by those of the first and second classes, in reference to the warlike demonstration made by both shades of the British Aristocracy, in April last, versus the opinion expressed by Mr. Polk, in his Inaugural, namely—that our title to the Oregon territory was “clear and unquestionable.” What has been the result so far? The President, in his Message, claims *officially* the whole of Oregon, and yet we have news from England that the Message has had a *peaceful tendency*! and, it is generally said and believed, that some overtures to renew the negotiations have been made by the British ministry. I do not suppose that *they* will recede altogether from their pretensions; but, it must be admitted, that they have *receded considerably in their tone*. The abrupt change that has taken place, from hostile to pacific language towards this country, by the leading organ, the *Times*, is certainly remarkable. Well, in submitting the above remarks to the consideration of the third and fourth class of editors as aforesaid, I will thank them to answer candidly the following queries:—Do they believe that the organs of the British Aristocracy would have subdued so suddenly their language, after the receipt of the Message, if Mr. Polk had receded from the stand taken by the Inaugural? Do they believe, had this been the case, that better terms in favour of the United States would have been advocated by the *Times*, in three successive articles, which bear the stamp of being, at least, semi-official? I expect that the general answer will be a frank NO; at least, it will be so from those whose patriotism rises higher than private interest. And to all those who have so answered, I will remark, that we must, of course, continue the same policy that has produced *that change* in British feeling; and, in order to do it effectually, Congress, without any further loss of time, ought to adopt the *four measures* set forth in the preceding article, headed, “THE PROPER COURSE TO SECURE, PEACEABLY, THE WHOLE OF OREGON.”

NEW YORK, February 4th, 1846.

The Senate of the United States.

The two houses of Congress have been in session about ten weeks; what have they done? Numberless speeches have been made, but no legislation of any consequence has been accomplished. The great majority of the people have made up their minds, long ago, on the *propriety* of the measures recommended by the President, and on the *urgency* of carrying them into immediate effect; and yet, those measures continue to be the subject of an endless debate, eliciting the most discordant and conflicting opinions.

About the middle of December, General Cass, in a speech full of patriotism, urged on the Senate the propriety of an inquiry as to our means of defence, &c.; but, in reviewing the whole ground of our antagonist position with England, he overshot the mark, by stating that war is nearly inevitable—that England *never recedes*, and alarmed the timid, who thereupon made a great rally. On the 30th of December, Mr. Calhoun “defines his position”—opposes the measures recommended by the President, under cover of taking his part against pretended implications of Mr. Hannegan on the course of the President; and, decidedly, Mr. Calhoun gave the cold shoulder to our claim on the Oregon territory. A few weeks afterwards, Mr. Benton opposes the bill increasing the steam navy:—first, if it was meant for a *peace measure*, because the appropriation was *too large*; second, if it was meant for a *war measure*, because it was *too small*. This is, truly, strange reasoning. It must strike any one, that a moderate appropriation for *precautionary armaments*, might *secure peace*, which is the object in view by the advocates of the bill. And if, on the other hand, war was to come notwithstanding, it cannot be amiss to have ten steamers ready for action, for the simple reason, that if thirty or forty steamers become necessary, in case of war, it will, certainly, be sooner accomplished by having already *ten* fitted out, than if we had none at all.

At a time when *decision* and *unanimity* in our councils become an object of the highest importance, it is really painful to see our leading Senators wasting their time and talents on such erratic courses. I hope, still, that the good sense and patriotism of a great majority of both parties in the Senate will see the necessity of great unanimity when the final vote will be taken on the Oregon measures; but, in case those measures were to be defeated, I make bold to state, beforehand, some of the consequences that would ensue; they would be the following:—

1st.—That this division in our councils would embolden the British Government to assume again a hostile attitude, which would be first felt by their exciting Mexico against us—by their increasing their naval forces on the stations bordering on our coasts—and apprehensions of war would be the immediate result.

2nd.—That the proper time to settle the Oregon question, according to the *decisive*, but *conciliatory* measures recommended in the preceding article, being thereby lost, the consequence would be, that it would remain open until the next elections, when it would be found that the *popular vote* would go for 54-40, which would render the settlement of the question more difficult.

3rd.—That the Senators, whose influence would have thus defeated the Oregon measures, would forfeit, by so doing, the confidence of the nation.

In conclusion, and in the warning voice of one who is entirely disconnected with party spirit—who looks only to the interest, the safety, and the good fame of the Republic—I cannot give up the pen without emphatically recommending *unanimity* in voting in favour of the Oregon measures, as the *most mighty weapon* that can be wielded by Congress. Let this **POTENT WEAPON** be properly applied, and there will be **NO WAR!**

AN ADOPTED CITIZEN.



